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fication of Lake Pontchartrain, and some of the. stronger de-
cisions classify it as an arm of the sea thereby making the land
at the water's edge "sea shore. ' 3 Even though it would make no
difference to the plaintiff in a particular case, the above lan-
guage of the court would tend to accentuate confusion concerning
the legal classification of Lake Pontchartrain. It would be more
helpful in the stabilization of the jurisprudence on Lake Pont-
chartrain and the Louisiana rules of property if the court main-
tained consistency on the classification of this body of water.
SUCCESSIONS, DONATIONS, AND
COMMUNITY PROPERTY*
Harriet S. Daggett**
SUCCESSIONS
In Roy 0. Martin Lumber Company v. Strange' suit was in-
stituted under the provisions of R.S. 9:171 et seq.,2 dealing with
the partition of an absentee's property by private sale, seeking
the partition of certain property in which the plaintiff owned a
31/32d interest, and a 1/32d interest being owned by the defend-
ant. The defendant contended that the statutes were not ap-
plicable for the reason that her domicile was well known to the
plaintiff, and that because of her appearance through counsel of
her own choice, having been made counsel of record, she was not
an absentee within the meaning of the statute. The court, on
rehearing, held that the whole tenor of R.S. 9 :171 et seq. clearly
demonstrates that the provisions were only meant to apply to an
absentee whose whereabouts are unknown, who remains un-
known, and who has made no appearance, either in person or by
counsel of record. The court supported its conclusion by refer-
ence to particular provisions of the statute requiring publication
of the notice of the filing of the petition in a newspaper and the
appointment of an attorney at law to "represent the absent, un-
located or deceased owner," stating that the former were intend-
3. See Comment, Seashore in Louisiana, 8 TUL. L. REV. 272 (1934).
*Grateful acknowledgment is hereby registered to my student and friend Dale
Powers for his work in the preparation of these materials.
*#Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
.1. 236 La. 77, 106 So.2d 723 (1958).
2. After institutionof this suit, LA- R.S. 9:171 et seq. (Supp. 1959) were
amended by La. Acts 1956, No. 534.
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ed to apply to one who was not only absent but was in fact unrep-
resented in the proceedings.
The conclusion reached seems to be a proper interpretation
of the statute. If the statute were held to apply to the case under
discussion, serious constitutional issues concerning due process
and equal protection of the laws might arise. To deny the right
of a public sale to a person solely because he is a resident of a
state other than Louisiana, and to afford the right of public sale
to residents of Louisiana, would seem to be arbitrarily discrimi-
nating against nonresidents who have property interests in
Louisiana. Such a holding would jeopardize the interest of all
nonresident co-owners by putting them at the mercy of Louisiana
residents.
In Babineaux v. Babineaux8 the court held that the judge
must order the property partitioned in kind unless it be proved
that it is indivisible by its nature or that loss or inconvenience
to one of its owners would be the consequence of dividing it.4
The evidence offered to prove otherwise was not sufficient to
overcome this rule, which has been consistently enforced in judi-
cial partitions.
DONATIONS
Donations Inter Vivos
In Broussard v. Doucet5 action was brought to set aside a
purported exchange of property on the ground that it was in
truth and in fact a donation and was void as a donation omnium
bonorum. The evidence showed that the plaintiff conveyed to
defendant Doucet 20 arpents of land in Vermilion Parish, which
had a value of $150 an acre, or at least a total valuation, of
$2,500, in exchange for the life usufruct of one acre of land and
a dwelling house 12 feet long by 12 feet wide, which had a value
of $200. In 1952 Doucet conveyed the land to defendant Mar-
ceaux who sold the land to defendant Guidry. All the instru-
ments were recorded in the conveyance records of Vermilion
Parish. The evidence further showed that defendants Doucet
and Marceaux had full knowledge of the fact that the plaintiff
3. 237 La. 806, 112 So.2d 620 (1959).
4. Aucoin v. Greenwood, 199 La. 764, 7 So.2d 50 (1942); Succession of
Miller v. Evans, 184 La. 933, 168 So. 106 (1936) ; Rayner v. Rayner, 171 La.
1050, 132 So. 784 (1931) ; Hoss v. Hardeman, 156 La. 371, 100 So. 532 (1924);
Kaffie v. Wilson, 130 La. 350, 57 So. 1001 (1911).
5. 236 La. 217, 107 So.2d 448 (1958).
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was disposing of all her property and that she was of such feeble
mentality that she could not take care of herself or manage her
own affairs. The court held that as to defendant Doucet the pur-
ported act of exchange was void ab initio under Article 1497 of
the Civil Code, which states that if the donor divests himself of
all his property the donation is null for the whole. As an addi-
tional ground the court stated that the exchange would be void
under Article 12, which states that whatever is done in contra-
vention of a prohibitory law is void. Defendant Marceaux con-
tended that the law of registry as announced by the court in
McDuffie v. Walkee and Martin v. Fuller7 should apply, but the
court held otherwise stating: "We give full recognition to the
holding of those cases. However, we do not think that the law
of registry has any application to the facts and circumstances
of the instant case insofar as Marceaux is concerned." The
court further stated that the public records doctrine should not
be applied under the peculiar facts and circumstances of this
case, 9 as fraud vitiates all things10 and the defendants "should
not be permitted to use the public records doctrine of this state
as a cloak for their wrongdoing."
The writer feels that the court properly decided the case as
the facts were very strong in favor of the plaintiff, and the court
would not allow the conspiracy to be successful.
In Garcia v. Dulcich" property was conveyed to the plaintiff
and defendant as copurchasers. Approximately eight months
after the sale, the plaintiff instituted suit to have himself de-
clared the sole owner of the property, contending that the con-
dition in the purchase agreement had not been fulfilled. The
court held that the transaction, although disguised as a sale,
was in truth and in fact an onerous donation and was subject
to revocation as defendant failed to comply with the conditions
of the donation. The court further stated that the value of the
charges imposed on the donee were immaterial in the instant
case. If the instrument were subject to the rules governing
donations, it may be revoked under Article 1559 of the Civil
6. 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1909).
7. 214 La. 404, 37 So.2d 851 (1948).
8. Guidry, Marceaux's vendee, did not appeal.
9. See Sanders v. Mitchell, 153 La. 1087, 97 So. 200 (1923).
10. Board of Com'rs of Orleans Levee Dist. v. Shushan, 197 La. 598, 2 So.2d
35 (1941) ; Cuselich v. Cuselich, 159 La. 652, 106 So. 20 (1925) ; Yeager Milling
Co. v. Lawler, 39 La. Ann. 572, 2 So. 398 (1887).
11. 237 La. 359, 111 So.2d 309 (1959).
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Code for "non-performance of the conditions imposed on the
donee.'.' If governed by the law of contracts, it may be dissolved
for non-performance of its conditions or the failure of considera-
tion under Articles 2045, 2046, 2130, and 2561 of the Civil Code.
Donations Mortis Causa
In Succession of Blaum12 the testator provided for numerous
particular legacies and then stated: "and the balance of my
estate to be divided equally between my brothers Frank B.
Blaum, Louis Blaum and my sister Mrs. Annie Frantz, and the
children of my deceased brother, August Blaum, and the chil-
dren of my deceased sister, Mrs. Clara Foerster." Opposition
to the executor's distribution, which was by roots into five equal
parts, was filed by the five children of the deceased brother
August Blaum, who contended that the division should be by
heads into equal parts. In rejecting the argument of the op-
ponents the court, relying on Article 1712 of the Civil Code,
held that the testator intended the equal division of the residuum
of his estate to be made by roots and not by heads was clearly
shown (1) by the testator's failure to name the children of the
deceased brother and sister individually and (2) by his treat-
ment of them as two classes or groups and not as individual
persons. The court also applied the well-settled jurisprudential
rules that "in the interpretation of wills, the first and natural
impression conveyed to the mind on reading the clause is en-
titled to great weight,"1 3 and "that, in case of doubt, the inter-
pretation should be preferred which will approximate closest
to the legal order of distribution."'1 4 The court stated that under
both rules it would arrive at the same interpretation, i.e., that
the testator intended the residuum of his property to be divided
by roots and not by heads. The court also held that the words
"to be divided equally" do not necessarily or in all cases import
a division by heads and that the words must be interpreted in
their own particular context in each will.
In Succession of Elliott 5 under an olographic will testatrix
bequeathed one-third interest in certain land to her daughter
and granddaughter, share and share alike. The will also be-
queathed to her daughter the remainder of "my disposable por-
12. 236 La. 1046, 110 So.2d 95 (1959).
13. Succession of La Barre, 179 La. 45, 48, 153 So. 15, 16 (1934).
14. Burthe v. Denis, 31 La. Ann. 568 (1879).
15. 237 La. 457, 111 So.2d 344 (1959).
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tion of my estate," The granddaughter opposed the proposed
plan of distribution of the assets contending that she was en-
titled to be recognized as a special legatee under the will be-
queathing her one-half of testatrix' one-third interest in certain
land and that in addition thereto she was entitled as a forced
heir to her legitime. The court applied the well-settled prin-
ciples of law used in the interpretation of wills 16 and held that
as the testatrix explicitly and clearly intended the bequest of land
be taken from the disposable portion of her entire estate the
opponent was entitled to the special legacy designated in the
will in addition to her legitime. As the court stated in the
opinion, "How else could there be a remainder of the disposable
portion if the bequests of the land were not donations mortis
causa of the disposable portion in favor of the named legatees ?"
In such a case there can be no doubt from the very language of
the will that it was the intent of the testatrix to bequeath the
full disposable portion of her estate to the named legatees.
In Succession of Holland17 the opponents, testamentary co-
executors in a prior will, petitioned to have declared null and
void a subsequent will on the ground of testamentary incapacity
of the testator at the time of the execution of the will. The op-
ponents were faced with a presumption of sanity on the part
of the decedent and carried the burden of proving the alleged
lack of capacity by strong, clear, and convincing evidence. In
finding that the will should be admitted to probate, the court
held that the medical testimony adduced at the trial that at
the time of the execution of the will the testator was in a state
of progressive hepatic failure was insufficient to overcome the
presumption of testamentary capacity. The court further held
that lay testimony must be taken in connection with expert
medical testimony, and that such weight should be attached to
it as will guide the court in resolving the issue of mental ca-
pacity.
COMMUNITY PROPERTY,
In Bagala v. Bagala18 a question arose as to the classification
of a tract of land acquired by plaintiffs' father before marriage;
but which, after marriage, was conveyed to a third party for
16. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1712, 1713, 1493 (1870); Succession of Price, 202
La. 842, 854, 13 So.2d 240, 244 (1943).
17. 236 La. 8, 106 So.2d 697 (1958).
18. 237 La. 60, 110 So.2d 526 (1959).
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$600, and on the same day was reconveyed by the third party
to the father for $601. The plaintiffs contended that the latter
transaction changed the character of the property from separate
property to property belonging to the community of acquets and
gains. The court, relying on Ruffino v. Hunt 9 and Lazaro v.
Lazaro,20 held that there had been no acquisition by the husband
during the existence of the community as contemplated by Ar-
ticle 2402 of the Civil Code, and that such a transaction is
nothing more than a pignorative contract. The court further
stated that the instruments themselves most clearly indicated
that the two transactions were nothing more than the execution
of a mortgage and consequently held that the property in ques-
tion had been the separate property of the father. The court
refused to apply the plaintiffs' argument of the well-settled
principle of law prevailing in this state that the acquisition of
property by a husband during marriage without a declaration
in the deed that the property is acquired with the husband's
separate funds for his separate estate conclusively precludes the
husband from later contending that the property does not belong
to the community.21 This decision seems to be sound, as it has
never been the intention of the law to produce a change in the
status of property from separate to community as the conse-
quence of placing a secured loan thereon.
In Sirocka v. United States Rubber Company22 the plaintiff
sued seeking to enjoin the sheriff from selling an immovable,
which plaintiff claimed to be her separate property, where the
purpose of the sale was to satisfy a judgment previously ob-
tained against the plaintiff's husband. The evidence showed
that the plaintiff, previous to her marriage, had accumulated
capital assets in excess of $12,000, and during marriage ac-
quired in her own name property for $8,000 - $4,000 cash and
the balance payable in installments. The court held that the
property was acquired by an investment of plaintiff's separate
and paraphernal funds, being derived from capital assets of her
business, which were under her exclusive control and adminis-
tration, and that the plaintiff, under the tests set forth in Fortier
v. Barry23 and Betz v. Riviere,24 had effectively rebutted the
19. 234 La. 91, 97, 99 So.2d 34, 36 (1958).
20. 92 So.2d 402 (La. App. 1957).
21. Slaton v. King, 214 La. 89, 36 So.2d 648 (1948).
22. 237 La. 505, 111 So.2d 752 (1959).
23. 111 La. 776, 778, 35 So. 900, 901 (1904).
24. 211 La. 43, 29 So.2d 465 (1947).
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presumption of community. The court, further stated that Ar-
ticle 2386 of the Civil' Code, which states that the fruits of the
paraphernal property of the wife fall into the community un-
less the wife, by written instrument, reserve,.such fruits for her
own separate use and benefit, was immaterial to the decision
as' the evidence clearly established that the funds derived from
capital assets owned by the plaintiff prior to her marriage, and
not earnings, were used to purchase the property.
In Nides v. Hoyle2 5 a divorced wife brought an action against
her former husband for partition by licitation of certain prop-
erty and an accounting. The evidence showed that in January
of 1943 the wife had purported to transfer her interest in the
property involved in this suit to her husband, and that in the
judgment of divorce, which was rendered in April of 1943, no
mention of community property appeared. Various arguments
were advanced regarding the effect of the document which the
wife had executed, but the court held it null under the well-
settled rule that husband and wife may not contract preceding
a separation from bed and board or divorce.26 A partition by
licitation of the property was granted after thirteen years of
co-ownership; and a stay of the sale for the purpose of adjusting
claims was denied as the court declared that an accounting must
follow and not precede the sale.27
'In Sallier v. Boudreaux2 8 the plaintiffs claimed that the in-
terest of their grandmother, who died prior to the death of
their grandfather, had not been conveyed in the succession sale
of their grandfather. The court, following the prior jurispru-
dence, held that where there are community debts all the com-
munity property can be administered and settled in the succes-
sion of the husband alone.29 The court further stated that
ordinarily there would be no legal presumption that the debts
were community obligations, but that there does attach to the
succession sale the legal presumption that all things were done
correctly in selling the entirety of the property ;3o and as the
25. 236 La. 1032, 109 So.2d 908 (1959).
26. Sheard v. Green, 219 La. 199, 52 So.2d 714 (1951).
27. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE arts. 1027, 1028, 1029, 1030 (1870).
28. 237 La. 909, 112 So.2d 657 (1959).
29. Kelley v. Kelley, 198 La. 338, 3 So.2d 641 (1941) ; Fontenot v. Fontenot,
157 La. 511, 102 So. 590 (1924) ; Festivan v. Clement, 135 La. 938, 66 So. 304
(1914),; Kremer v. Kremer, 121 La. 484, 46 So. 600 (1908).
30. Hicks v. Hughes, 223 La. 290, 65 So.2d 603 (1953) Egle v. Constantin,
198 La. 899, 5 So.2d 281 (1941) ; Thibodeaux v. Barrow, 129 La. 395, 56 So. 339
(1911).
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property could only be administered and sold to pay community
debts, the presumption which attaches after this 67-year period
(term between the succession sale and the present attack) is
that community debts existed.
During the past term, the court also decided the following
cases dealing with successions, donations, and community prop-
erty. They are McGregor v. McGregor,81 which has been omitted
because the decision turned solely on questions of fact, and
Jones v. Jones,3 2 which has been omitted because it involved no
question of substantial import."
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
It has been said that, since man lives by his labors, when a
person renders beneficial services to another it is not to be pre-
sumed they are rendered gratuitously. Consequently when a
person having the opportunity to reject the services of another
receives the benefit of them knowing or having reason to know
that they are not being rendered gratuitously, he thereby con-
sents to pay their reasonable value. These principles were in-
volved in Bender v. International Paint Co.' where a realtor was
claiming a commission by way of quantum meruit for bringing
a lessor and lessee together. Both parties were made defendants.
The court found against the realtor on the facts, since it ap-
peared that neither party had reason to believe that the payment
of a commission was his responsibility. A generous reading of
plaintiff's case might have indicated that his claim, based on the
allegation that he was the procuring cause of the lease, was ac-
tually planted on the theory that he was entitled to recover in
quasi contract to prevent the unjust enrichment of the defend-
ants. It is not clear that this possibility was considered by the
court. If so, it may have been believed that there was no show-
ing of enrichment or no showing that whatever enrichment may
have occurred was unjust. The fact that plaintiff was claiming
31. 236 La. 184, 107 So.2d 437 (1958).
32. 236 La. 52, 106 So.2d 713 (1958).
33. This case may be used as an aid for the analysis of complicated accounting
procedures.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 237 La. 569, 111 So.2d 775 (1959).
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